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Gambling with Equal Protection:  
Connecticut’s Exploitation of Mancari  
and the Tribal Gaming Framework 
ALLISON S. ERCOLANO 
Recent legislation passed in Connecticut grants two Indian tribes an 
exclusive right to pursue development of the state’s third casino. On one 
hand, financial benefits stemming from casinos enhance tribal self-
sufficiency, foster tribal wealth, and provide an economic benefit to the 
state. On the other hand, legislation that allows for these benefits often 
does so by singling out Indians as a separate and distinct entity. 
Connecticut’s legislation comes at a precarious time as a legal attack on 
the preferential treatment of Indians gains traction in the courts. As it now 
stands, federal statutes singling out Indians are not subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny, and will be upheld by a court so long as a legitimate end 
is furthered. This Note seeks to explore the boundaries of Connecticut’s 
law in comparison with the federal Indian gaming regulatory framework 
and contemplates whether the law can serve a legitimate end. After 
describing and analyzing the state statute, this Note then suggests that the 
current void of legal guidance over preferential state tribal gaming laws 
will allow states like Connecticut to exploit Indians in the name of money.  
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Gambling with Equal Protection:  
Connecticut’s Exploitation of Mancari  
and the Tribal Gaming Framework 
ALLISON S. ERCOLANO* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
MGM Resorts International Global Gaming Development, LLC 
(“MGM”) is currently working on the construction of a casino in 
Springfield, Massachusetts, slotted to open by the fall of 2018, thereby 
joining the ranks of the major casinos located in New England.1 More 
specifically, MGM’s casino will be the third casino located along the 
Interstate 91 corridor between Massachusetts and Connecticut.2 If 
combined net profits totaling nearly $1.5 billion in 2014 from nearby 
Foxwoods Resort Casino and Mohegan Sun Resort and Casino are any 
indication,3 MGM’s new casino stands to deliver significant revenue for 
the company. Despite expectations of high revenue, however, recent 
legislation passed in Connecticut stands to inhibit some of the expected 
profits and slow the success of MGM’s new casino, at least initially.  
The Connecticut legislature adopted Special Act No. 15-7 (the “Act”) 
on June 19, 2015, after numerous debates and significant revisions to the 
                                                                                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, expected May 2017; B.A., Franklin & 
Marshall College, 2012. Thank you to my family for their unwavering support and encouragement, 
especially to Millie. Thank you also to the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their diligent 
and thoughtful input, and a special thanks to Professor Bethany Berger, for suggesting and encouraging 
the topic of this Note.  
1 See Philip Marcelo, MGM Asks to Delay Opening Springfield Casino by a Year, WBUR (June 
25, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/2015/06/25/mgm-sprinfield-opening-delay [https://perma.cc/93WJ-
5YWQ] (reporting MGM’s expected opening date for its Springfield, Massachusetts casino to be 
September 5, 2018).  
2 See PYRAMID ASSOCS., LLC, NORTHEASTERN CASINO GAMING UPDATE 2015, 
at 4, 7 (2015), http://www.nathaninc.com/sites/default/files/Pub%20PDFs/2015_Northeastern_Casino_
Gaming_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EB5-CXW2] [hereinafter PYRAMID] (documenting that 
Foxwoods Resort Casino is located in Ledyard, Connecticut, approximately eight miles from Interstate 
95, and that Mohegan Sun is located in Montville, Connecticut, which is also close to Interstate 95). 
Interstate 95 is connected to Interstate 91. 
3 See id. at 4 (providing revenue and employment statistics for the two casinos in Connecticut); 
Gale Courey Toensing, Report: Foxwoods & Mohegan Sun Hard Hit by Regional Gaming Expansion, 
INDIAN COUNTRY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/03/10/report-fox 
woods-mohegan-sun-hard-hit-regional-gaming-expansion-159537 [https://perma.cc/ZMR6-TQ7L] 
(providing annual profits information for Connecticut’s two casinos).  
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proposed legislation.4 Entitled “An Act Concerning Gaming,” the Act 
grants Connecticut’s two federally-recognized tribes, the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe and the Mohegan Tribe of Connecticut (the “Tribes”),5 the 
ability to jointly register as a “tribal business entity” to build a casino in 
Connecticut. After public registration with Connecticut’s Secretary of 
State, the newly formed tribal business entity may issue a request to 
Connecticut towns to submit proposals for a gaming facility in their 
jurisdictions.6 Unsurprisingly, the Act is the subject of recent litigation 
filed on behalf of MGM in the United States District Court for the District 
of Connecticut.7 
This litigation adds to the debate regarding the proper level of judicial 
scrutiny to be applied to state legislation granting preferential treatment to 
Indian tribes. There has been a push within the last decade, resulting from 
the conflation of Indian law with affirmative action, to confine or overturn 
the pivotal Supreme Court case, Morton v. Mancari, which allows for 
preferential treatment of Indian tribes.8 Connecticut’s recent legislation 
extending an exclusive grant to its two federally-recognized tribes to 
pursue development of a new casino may result in a new constitutional 
framework regarding such preferential treatment. The Act challenges the 
traditional relationship established between Indians and the federal 
government that allows tribes to be classified as “political” rather than 
“racial” groups, by exploiting this relationship seemingly for the sole 
purpose of retaining cash flow within the state. This exploitation may be 
the trigger that causes an overhaul of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the level of judicial review applied to state gaming laws 
preferential to Indians.  
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a 
state cannot deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the 
laws.9 Accordingly, the Constitution requires that any state law carry out a 
                                                                                                                          
4 See S.B. 1090, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2015). 
5 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FEDERAL AND STATE RECOGNIZED TRIBES 
(Feb. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribe 
s.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RPZ-NVTJ] (providing a list of all federal and state recognized tribes in the 
United States).  
6 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.).  
7 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, MGM Resorts Int’l Glob. Gaming Dev., LLC 
v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2015).   
8 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential 
Treatment”, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 951 (2002) (discussing the recent litigation, scholarly work, and 
legislation vying to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision regarding legislation that grants preferential 
treatment for Indians); infra Part IV.B (discussing further the mounting attack on the Mancari 
doctrine).  
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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legitimate interest in a manner that is rationally related to that interest.10 
This less scrutinizing standard of judicial review, known as rational-basis 
review, requires a court to uphold any law that meets a legitimate 
governmental purpose.11 As rational-basis review is a less exacting 
standard, it is rare for a court to overturn a law under its application.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence also requires courts to look closely at 
legislation that singles out groups of individuals because of race or national 
origin. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
legislation that is facially discriminatory or discriminatory in its effect, is 
prohibited unless it serves a compelling state interest.12 The standard 
applied to race-based or national-origin-based legislation, known as strict 
scrutiny review, is applied as a more rigorous standard of review by a 
court.13 Ultimately, because of the difference in intensity of the two 
standards, the level of judicial scrutiny applied in a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act will be dispositive in any equal protection 
claims brought against it.14   
In its lawsuit, MGM claims the Act violates the Equal Protection 
Clause because it is facially preferential to Indian tribes, a group that can 
be considered a “race” under the constitutional analytic framework. MGM 
further argues that Connecticut is unable to advance a compelling state 
interest to justify its preferential treatment towards the Tribes, and 
therefore the Act should be struck down.15  
However, it is not seriously disputed whether Connecticut, or any state, 
has a legitimate interest in developing and maintaining casinos within their 
                                                                                                                          
10 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“We have attempted to reconcile the principle with 
reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will 
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” 
(citations omitted)). 
11 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). 
12 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we hold today 
that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other 
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests.”). 
13 Id. State classifications based on race or national origin must advance a compelling government 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. Id.  
14 The level of scrutiny applied is important to the success of the litigation: 
If a rational basis test is applied, federal legislation helping federal tribes is usually 
found to complement governmental objectives, and easily found constitutional; 
conversely, if strict scrutiny is applied, such legislation is usually found 
unconstitutional. Thus, parties involved in applicable cases tend to battle over 
whether application of strict scrutiny or a rational basis test is most appropriate. 
Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Lost in the Shuffle: State-Recognized Tribes and the Tribal Gaming 
Industry, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 327, 364–65 (2006).  
15 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13–14, supra note 7. For a more 
detailed discussion of MGM’s complaint, see infra Part II.A. 
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borders.16 For example, pursuant to existing agreements with the Tribes, 
Connecticut shares in the gaming revenues from the Foxwoods and 
Mohegan Sun casinos.17 Not only does Connecticut receive twenty-five 
percent of the profits of the slot machines from its two casinos, but the 
casinos provide jobs for approximately 14,763 people in the state.18 A third 
casino with additional slot machines will only increase the revenue the 
state receives from the Tribes.19 Moreover, as the two casinos have already 
created thousands of jobs for the citizens of the state, a third would likely 
accomplish the same.20 It is therefore in Connecticut’s interest to develop 
casinos in order to continue to receive revenues from slot machines and to 
provide more jobs for its residents.21 Congress itself has acknowledged the 
governmental interests of involvement in tribal gaming. A court noted that:  
In the [Senate] Committee’s view, both State and tribal 
                                                                                                                          
16 Presently, the sixty-four casinos in New England represent a $17 billion industry. PYRAMID, 
supra note 2, at vi.  
17 See generally Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact, 59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 
16, 1994); Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of Connecticut, 
56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing the revenue-sharing agreements between Connecticut and 
the Tribes, among other specifications); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 12.05[2], at 891 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter, COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“[S]tates have 
been able to share in tribal gaming revenues in exchange for exclusive rights to game within a state—at 
least as against non-Indian gaming.”); PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 23 (“In Calendar Year 2014, 
Foxwoods paid $120,899,855 to the State of Connecticut. Mohegan Sun paid $145,978,050 to the State 
of Connecticut in CY 2014.”).  
18 See Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. DEP’T. OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: GAMING DIV. 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://ct.gov/dcp/cwp/view.asp?a=4107&q=483116 [https://perma.cc/5W2T-79WK] 
(explaining that Connecticut receives 25% of each casino’s slot “win”); PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 4 
(providing 2014 employment statistics for Connecticut’s two casinos).   
19 The Tribes anticipate opening a third casino with at least 2,000 slot machines and 100 to 150 
playing tables. Kenneth R. Gosselin, Tribes Say They Don’t Have Location Selected Yet, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.courant.com/real-estate/property-line/hc-connecticut-third-casino 
-20160208-story.html [https://perma.cc/F8NB-3644].  
Assuming the ultimate constitutionality and success of implementing the new Act, the question 
will likely become one of market oversaturation: will Connecticut be able to generate new demand, 
recapture revenue, and regenerate job positions lost to other states in order to successfully sustain a 
third casino? See generally PYRAMID, supra note 2, at viii (explaining that Connecticut will need to 
accept a new casino with lower operating and profit margins due to the increased number of casinos 
now located throughout New England). 
20 See Ken Dixon, Pequots, Mohegans, Sign Deal to Create a Cooperative Casino, CONN. POST 
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Pequots-Mohegans-will-sign-deal-to-create-a-
6495639.php [https://perma.cc/RE2E-HM6S] (“A study commissioned by the tribes projected a new 
casino could create about 6,000 jobs and generate $78 million in new taxes.”).  
21 In the wake of the 2008 recession, however, it is important to note the diminishing return 
stemming from gaming not just in Connecticut but across the nation. Gambling is a form of 
discretionary spending—that is, the type of spending that is the first to be abandoned in strained 
financial times, and the last to come back when the economy returns to normal. Revenue from casinos 
has been steadily falling due to the lingering effects of the recession. See PYRAMID, supra note 2, at iv, 
ix, xvi, 7 (providing a more in-depth discussion of the effects of consumer spending on revenue profits 
at casinos nationwide, including those in Connecticut).  
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governments have significant governmental interests in the 
conduct of class III gaming. . . . A State’s governmental 
interests with respect to class III gaming on Indian lands 
include the interplay of such gaming with the State’s public 
policy, safety, law and other interests, as well as impacts on 
the State’s regulatory system, including its economic 
interests in raising revenue for its citizens.22  
Connecticut has a valid economic interest in establishing casinos in its 
borders. MGM, however, believes that Connecticut has gone too far in 
attempting to protect this economic interest.  
In addition to raising constitutional questions of equal protection 
violations, the advent of Connecticut’s innovative legislation paints a 
broader picture of the future relationship between states and tribes in the 
realm of tribal gaming. More specifically, Connecticut’s legislation may 
serve as the type of legislation that finally results in a revision of Supreme 
Court Indian law jurisprudence. This Note proposes that, at this precarious 
time where the Supreme Court’s stance on laws favorable toward Indians 
is under attack,23 legislation such as this demands a more scrutinizing 
judicial review in order to sufficiently rein in states that are seeking to 
exploit tribal gaming within their borders.  
The following section will introduce Connecticut’s legislation and 
provide an overview of the pending MGM litigation. Part III will discuss 
relevant Supreme Court precedent in the tribal gaming field and its 
subsequent application throughout the circuit courts. Part IV will conclude 
with an analysis of the Act’s role in the current framework of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and a prediction of its effect on future constitutional 
challenges to state gaming laws granting preferential treatment to Indians.  
II.  CONNECTICUT SPECIAL ACT 15-7 
The Act provides for the development of a casino gaming facility in 
any of Connecticut’s towns or cities. Notably under the Act, a proposed 
casino can be developed on a site that is not specifically located on the 
Tribes’ reservation land that has already been established in Connecticut.24 
The Act contains no express provision that the towns’ proposals or the 
development agreement be limited to a site on Indian land. Rather, it 
provides that “[t]he tribal business entity may enter into a development 
                                                                                                                          
22 Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 726 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a description of Class III gaming, see infra Part III.A.  
23 Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault on Morton v. 
Mancari, 60 FED. L. 47, 51 (2013). 
24 See 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). The Foxwoods Casino and the Mohegan Sun Resort 
and Casino are located on the Tribes’ reservation land in Connecticut. PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 4, 7. 
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agreement with a municipality regarding the establishment of a possible 
casino gaming facility in such municipality.”25 The Act details steps that 
the Tribes must take to develop a third casino.26 First, the Tribes are 
required to create a “tribal business entity” that is owned exclusively by 
their members.27 Leaders for the Tribes took such a step, and on August 
24, 2015, registered “MMCT Venture, LLC” with Connecticut’s Secretary 
of State.28 In compliance with the Act, MMCT Venture next submitted a 
copy of their request for proposals for a development site with 
Connecticut’s Department of Consumer Protection, which listed the 
request on its website.29 Per the Act, any proposal and agreement is subject 
to approval by the Connecticut legislature, which must first amend state 
law to provide for the operation of a third casino gaming facility.30 A 
proposed casino may not open until this law has been ratified, which is 
presumably an arduous process replete with debates and hearings at 
                                                                                                                          
25 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.) (emphasis added). 
26 See Kat Greene, MGM Isn’t Harmed by Tribal Casino Law, Conn. Gov. Says, LAW360 (Sept. 
23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/706607/mgm-isn-t-harmed-by-tribal-casino-law-conn-gov-
says [https://perma.cc/6QM5-HPD4] (“The law creates a series of hurdles that the Mashantucket 
Pequot and Mohegan tribes—direct competitors in the casino business—must jump through to build a 
third casino in the state.”).  
27 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.). The requirement that the tribal business entity be owned 
exclusively by the Tribes comports with the federal legislation regarding tribal gaming. Under the 
federal statute, an Indian tribe must maintain the sole proprietary interest in any gaming operation. 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(2)(a), (d)(1)(ii) (2012) [hereinafter IGRA]; see 
also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.09, at 912 (“IGRA requires the Indian tribe to own any 
Indian gaming operation and retain the ‘sole proprietary interest’ in the enterprise . . . . In other words, 
a tribe is prohibited from alienating this valuable asset.”). See infra Part III.B for a further discussion of 
the requirements of the federal statute.  
28 CONN. SEC’Y OF STATE, BUSINESS INQUIRY: MMCT VENTURE, LLC (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.concord-sots.ct.gov/CONCORD/online?sn=PublicInquiry&eid=9740 [https://perma.cc/L3 
BT-E8QH]. MMCT Venture’s registered principal officer, Kevin Brown, also serves as the chairman of 
the Mohegan Tribal Council. See id. (listing Kevin Brown as manager of MMCT Venture, LLC); 
Government: The Mohegan Tribal Council, MOHEGAN TRIBE (2015), http://www.mohegan.nsn.us/ 
government/government-structure/tribal-council [https://perma.cc/JP8D-Q57V]; see also Tribes Sign 
Agreement on Third Connecticut Casino Location, WFSB-3 CONN. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.wfsb. 
com/story/29998185/tribes-to-sign-agreement-on-third-connecticut-casino-location [https://perma.cc/ 
N3QL-JA2J] (detailing the signing of the partnership agreement between the two tribes at the capitol 
building in Hartford, Connecticut on September 10, 2015). 
29 The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection listed the request on its website on 
October 1, 2015. 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.) (“The department [of Consumer protection] shall 
post such requests for proposals on its Internet web site.”); MMCT Venture, LLC, Request for 
Proposals, CONN. DEP’T OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/M 
MCT_Request_for_Proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SC6-22D6] (detailing MMCT’s request to 
Connecticut towns for proposals to build the state’s third casino).  
30 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.) (“Any such development agreement shall be contingent 
upon amendment to state law enacted by the General Assembly that provides for the operation of and 
participation in a casino gaming facility by such tribal business entity.”). Under IGRA, existing state 
law must already legalize gaming in order for any tribe to operate casinos on reservation land. 25 
U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012).  
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Connecticut General Assembly sessions.31  
The current structure of Connecticut’s law raises serious implications 
for its ability to comport with federal gaming requirements. First, the Act 
states that its provisions “shall not be construed to authorize the formation 
of more than one tribal business entity,”32 meaning only the Mashantucket 
and Pequot tribes can open Connecticut’s third casino. Second, 
Connecticut’s new law does not require the tribal business entity and the 
state to enter into a tribal-state gaming compact, a provision required under 
federal law for gaming on Indian lands.33 Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the 
Act does not require that the proposed casino be located on tribal land of 
either of the Tribes, another requirement listed under the federal statute.34   
On July 22, 2015, MGM35 attempted to register a tribal business entity 
with Connecticut’s Secretary of State, pursuant to the Act. MGM received 
a prompt rejection on July 23, 2015, stating that its proposal did not 
comply with the Act because MGM had no affiliation with either of 
Connecticut’s tribes.36 MGM subsequently filed a lawsuit against 
Connecticut’s Governor, Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of its 
Department of Consumer Protection on August 4, 2015.  
                                                                                                                          
31 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). 
32 Id. 
33 In fact, in lieu of a “tribal-gaming compact”, the Act requires only that the Connecticut 
legislature amend state law “to provide for the operation of and participation in” a third casino run by 
the tribal business entity. 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). See infra Part II.A.1 for an explanation 
of the compacts required between a tribe and a state under IGRA. 
34 As noted above, the Act specifically states that the tribal business entity may review proposals 
“regarding the establishment of a possible casino gaming facility in a municipality.” 2015 Conn. Acts 
1484 (Spec. Sess.); see also Letter from George C. Jepsen, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., 
State of Conn., to Legislator Leadership, Conn. Gen. Assembly 2 (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/upload/2015/04/20150415_Legislator_Leadership_Letter.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W8R4-SXA6] (“As we understand it, the proposed legislation would include the following 
principal elements: The law would authorize the licensing of one or more casino gaming facilities to be 
operated by some form of joint venture by the Tribes. The facilities would not be located on reservation 
lands and would not involve the federal government taking any lands into trust for the Tribes.”). 
35 MGM is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a miscellaneous 
amusement and recreation business. See MGM Resorts International Global Gaming Development, 
LLC, WHALE WISDOM (2016), http://whalewisdom.com/filer/mgm-resorts-international-global-gaming 
-development-llc#tabsummary_tab_link [https://perma.cc/2YF3-73P9] (providing MGM’s Securities 
and Exchange Commission listing code). Per its website, MGM “develops, builds and operates unique 
destination resorts designed to provide a total resort experience, including first-class accommodations 
and dining, world-class entertainment, state-of-the-art meeting and convention facilities, and high-
quality retail and gaming experiences.” Company Overview, MGM RESORTS INT’L (2016), 
http://www.mgmresorts.com/company/company-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ASX-9F89]. 
Moreover, MGM describes itself as “one of the world’s leading global hospitality companies, operating 
a world-renowned portfolio of destination resort brands.” MGM Resorts International Global Gaming 
Development, LLC, EDGAR ONLINE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfiling 
info.aspx?FilingID=10530371-9693499819&type=sect&TabIndex=2&companyid=877290&ppu=%25 
2fdefault.aspx%253fcompanyid%253d877290 [https://perma.cc/ESS9-P7FV] (providing MGM’s 
prospectus). 
36 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11–12, supra note 7. 
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At its core, MGM’s lawsuit alleges that the Act defies the United 
States Constitution by violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant commerce clause.37 MGM argues 
that the Act has created a “race-based set-aside in favor of the two 
Preferred Tribes at the expense of all other tribes, races, and entities[,]”38 
and that the Connecticut legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause 
by granting such preferential treatment to a racial group without 
simultaneously advancing a compelling government interest to justify the 
discriminatory treatment.39 MGM further alleges that the Connecticut 
legislature has, in effect, created “an exclusive, no-bid process for the 
Preferred Tribes” to present a proposal for an otherwise off-reservation, 
commercial casino in the state.40 This exclusive, no-bid process has a 
detrimental impact on non-tribal competitors, such as MGM, because it 
denies them a fair opportunity to compete for the construction of 
Connecticut’s third casino.41 MGM stated the “plain intent of the Act is 
that an agreement be reached between the Preferred Tribes and a 
municipality . . . with no opportunities for MGM or any other entities to 
compete” and that it was “unlikely subsequent legislation would allow 
MGM or other entities to compete for a Connecticut casino.”42 MGM 
further contended that even if it were allowed to compete for the casino, it 
would nonetheless be at a competitive disadvantage “given that the 
Preferred Tribes would have already reached an agreement with a 
municipality and have made other preparations to gain a preferred market 
position.”43  
                                                                                                                          
37 Id. at 2. This paper will focus exclusively on discussions of equal protection violations. The 
issues raised regarding dormant commerce clause violations will be discussed only briefly.   
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 13–14.  
40 Id. at 2.  
41 Id. at 12. 
42 Id.   
43 Id. MGM next alleges that the Act violates the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. 
Specifically, MGM alleges that Connecticut has unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate 
commerce because the Act “prohibits all out-of-state entities, including MGM, from competing to 
develop a Connecticut casino and reserves those development opportunities to the Connecticut-based 
Preferred Tribes.” Id. at 15. MGM believes that Connecticut is also unable to “make any showing that 
the Act is the only means available to advance a legitimate local interest,” thereby violating the 
Constitution’s prohibition on states from adopting legislation that improperly burdens interstate 
commerce. Id. On its face, MGM argues, the Act serves only to protect Connecticut’s local interest in 
ensuring additional revenue flow to the Tribes from owning and operating the third casino. Id. at 16. 
MGM notes, however, that presumably any out-of-state casino developer could provide similar tax, 
employment, and other benefits to the state as what the Tribes could, arguing essentially that the Act’s 
goal of ensuring an additional revenue flow to the Tribes is not a sufficient local interest to justify 
discrimination against out-of-state competition. Id.  
This argument is unlikely to prevail in federal court. As explained previously, IGRA 
contemplates a revenue-sharing agreement between states and tribes, and one that can be designed to 
enhance the economic benefits to the states. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.05[2], at 
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In response to the defendants’ first motion to dismiss filed on 
September 23, 2015,44 MGM filed an amended complaint on October 5, 
2015.45 In its amended complaint, MGM highlighted various developments 
that had occurred since the date of its original complaint.46 In particular, 
MGM noted that since MMCT Venture’s request for proposals had been 
posted on the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection website, 
towns in Connecticut “have taken steps to convince the Preferred Tribes to 
engage in discussions with them about a casino development agreement.”47 
Indeed, towns continue to vie for the opportunity to have a casino in their 
jurisdiction, rather than on the Tribes’ reservations. As of September 28, 
2015, the town of Enfield was considering a potential site for the casino at 
the town’s aging Enfield Square Mall.48 As of October 2015, the towns of 
East Windsor, East Hartford, and Windsor Locks also continued to discuss 
submitting plans for consideration of the casino site.49 As MGM correctly 
noted, the Tribes will clearly be building a casino outside of any federally-
recognized Indian land. The failure to locate the third casino on land 
belonging to either Tribe may be a decisive factor in the district court’s 
                                                                                                                          
891 (“The Secretary of the Interior has approved revenue-sharing agreements on the ground that those 
[revenue shares going to states] are not taxes, but exchanges of cash for significant economic value 
conferred by the exclusive or substantially exclusive right to conduct gaming in the state.”).   
44 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, 22–24, MGM 
Resorts Int’l Glob. Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2015) 
(arguing the court should dismiss plaintiffs’ claims because (1) as MGM had not suffered a cognizable 
and particularized injury, it did not have standing to sue; and (2) even if MGM could claim some 
injury, its claims were not ripe for judicial review because MGM lacked such cognizable injury and the 
issue would be better decided later, when any harm was no longer so speculative).   
45 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, MGM Resorts Int’l Glob. 
Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 2015). 
46 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 7. 
47 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, supra note 45 (citations 
omitted). MGM noted that East Hartford’s Planning and Zoning Commission approved a proposed 
casino site on September 23, 2015. Id. (citations omitted). 
48 See Mikaela Porter, Clock Ticking As Enfield Starts Talking Casinos In Earnest, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-northern-connecticut-
casinos-20150928-story.html [https://perma.cc/WX9V-E576] (discussing Enfield’s considerations in 
hosting a casino).  
49 See Jordan Otero, East Hartford Casino Proposal Moves Forward, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.courant.com/community/east-hartford/hc-east-hartford-showcase-cinema-
special-permit-vote-20150924-story.html [https://perma.cc/PAD3-CJAT] (discussing East Hartford’s 
consideration of hosting a casino); Porter, supra note 48 (reporting on Enfield); Matthew Sturdevant, 
East Windsor Prepares for Possible Casino Proposal, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2015), 
http://www.courant.com/business/hc-east-windsor-casino-referendum-20150424-story.html [https://per 
ma.cc/4V63-RB3C] (reporting on East Windsor’s consideration of hosting a casino); Jeff Zalesin, 
Conn. Town to Weigh Proposal for Tribal Airport Casino, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.law 
360.com/articles/716490/conn-town-to-weigh-proposal-for-tribal-airport-casino [https://perma.cc/L5X 
3-NLCX] (discussing Bradley Airport’s interest in establishing a casino site in the town of Windsor 
Locks). 
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analysis of the constitutionality of the state statute.50  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
A.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act51 and Mancari: States’ Roles in 
Federally Authorized Tribal Gaming 
Connecticut is not the first state to pass a law that grants preferential 
treatment to Indian tribes to conduct gaming operations.52 Connecticut’s 
law, however, is unique because it circumvents the traditional 
understanding of Indian-state gaming relations that has developed since the 
passage of the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act (“IGRA”) in 1988.53 
Connecticut’s law represents a new breed of a state tribal-gaming 
regimes—a breed that may finally tilt the balance in favor of a higher level 
of judicial scrutiny when courts assess constitutional implications of equal 
protection within the Indian-relations sphere. 
B.  The Federal Tribal Gaming Scheme 
Congress passed IGRA to provide a statutory construction for the 
operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes.54 Specifically, 
Congress passed the law in an effort to promote cooperation between the 
states and tribes in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in California 
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.55 In Cabazon, the Court was asked to 
determine the reach of a California law regulating vice activity and 
prohibiting gaming with regard to ongoing bingo operations conducted by 
federally-recognized tribes on reservation land.56 The Court found that 
there was no express federal grant of power to the states to regulate gaming 
                                                                                                                          
50 As of February 9, 2016, MMCT Venture had not selected an off-reservation site for the location 
of the third casino. Gosselin, supra note 19.  
51 For purposes of this paper, IGRA will be discussed only in relation to its creation and 
regulation of “Class III gaming”: gaming that is not regulated under Class I (“social games solely for 
prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming . . . in connection with tribal ceremonies, 
or celebrations”) or Class II gaming (bingo) but rather, those games traditionally seen at casinos such as 
baccarat, black jack, slot machines, and electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of 
chance. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)–(8) (2012). 
52 For example, state laws and constitutional amendments in California and Massachusetts have 
reflected a preference for Indian gaming at the expense of non-Indian interests. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. 
art. IV, § 19 (reflecting the Proposition 1A amendment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k (2011) (referencing 
the Massachusetts Gaming Act, although § 91 has not been codified).  
53 See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012).  
54 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012) (“The purpose of this chapter is-(1) to provide a statutory basis for 
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996) 
(noting the same).  
55 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
56 Id. at 204–06; see also Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 348. 
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and held that the federal policy promoting tribal economic development 
trumped California’s interest in controlling crime at the gaming sites.57 
After this decision, states expressed a desire for greater involvement in 
tribal gaming and, accordingly, IGRA now embodies the idea of 
cooperative federalism as it balances the interests of both the federal and 
state governments with Indian tribes.58  
IGRA’s principal goal is to further establish federal policy of 
“promot[ing] tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal government.”59 IGRA was designed to both preserve and 
balance the tribal business that had developed through the casino gaming 
industry on Indian lands, while still allowing states to retain some control 
over the federal reservations within their borders. IGRA streamlines the 
process for Indian tribes to become licensed to game within any state that 
does not already prohibit such gaming activity and defines the parameters 
of the competing sovereign interests involved in tribal gaming.  
Additionally, IGRA also provides for and defines the federal 
government’s regulatory role in tribal gaming. The law created the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”), which is vested with 
general oversight authority through the Secretary of the Interior.60 Among 
the Secretary of the Interior’s key functions under IGRA is the duty to 
approve or deny a “tribal-state compact.”61 A tribal-state compact is “a 
specific agreement between the particular state and the tribe that describes 
not only the type of games that the state will permit, but also the condition 
under which the casinos may operate the games.”62 A tribal-state compact 
is necessary in order for a state to permit a tribe to conduct Class III 
                                                                                                                          
57 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207–08, 216–22. 
58 See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 
2002) (“IGRA is an example of ‘cooperative federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing 
sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a 
role in the regulatory scheme.”).  
59 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2012); William Bennett Cooper III, What’s in the Cards for the Future of 
Indian Gaming Law?, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 131 (1998) (“As stated in the first section of 
IGRA, the purpose of the statute is to promote tribal economic development and simultaneous self-
sufficiency.”); Caitlin E. Flanagan, The Need for Compromise: Introducing Indian Gaming and 
Commercial Casinos to Massachusetts, 42 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 179, 188 (2008) (“Congress and tribes 
believe that Indian gaming will promote self-determination by making tribes economically independent 
and providing the means to address chronic issues affecting many tribes such as poverty, poor health, 
and substance abuse.”). 
60 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012); see also Mission, Principles and Priorities, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING 
COMM’N, http://www.nigc.gov/commission/mission-and-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/5R99-
6HMZ] (last visited Apr. 23, 2016) (stating that the mission of the NIGC is “[r]egulating Indian gaming 
to promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal governments . . . and to 
ensure that tribes are the primary beneficiaries of their gaming activities.”).  
61 25 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(3) (2012). 
62 Cooper, supra note 59, at 135.  
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gaming within its jurisdiction.63 The statute, therefore, facilitates state and 
tribal control over gaming falling exclusively on tribal land through the 
compacting process while retaining power in the federal government to 
ensure the law itself is not violated.64 
In addition to the tribal-state compact requirement, IGRA contemplates 
other specifications for tribal gaming. First, IGRA requires that Indian 
gaming be conducted on Indian lands.65 The term “Indian lands” as defined 
in the statute means: 
(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and 
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the 
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual 
or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction 
by the United States against alienation and over which an 
Indian tribe exercises governmental power.66 
IGRA’s terms, therefore, have limited the establishment of Class III 
gaming to land that is either held in trust or subject to a restriction by the 
federal government, or on federally-supervised Indian reservation land.67 
Second, the statute permits the state and tribe to enter into revenue-sharing 
agreements, which most often grant the tribe the exclusive right to game in 
a state in exchange for cash.68 The Secretary of the Interior has mandated 
that revenues from gaming may be used by a state “so long as the 
                                                                                                                          
63 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) (2012); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.02[1], at 
876 (noting that Class III games “can only be conducted pursuant to tribal-state compacts approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior”).   
64 Cooper, supra note 59, at 135–36. IGRA also provides for three requirements that must be met 
to allow Class III gaming: Class III gaming shall be lawful only on Indian lands only if such activities 
are authorized by a tribal-state compact, are located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose 
by any person or organization, and are conducted in conformance with the tribal-state compact entered 
into by the Indian tribe and the state. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).  
65 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B) (2012); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.02[1], at 876–
77 (explaining that tribal gaming is permitted only on Indian lands); see also The Commission: FAQs, 
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, http://www.nigc.gov/commission/faqs [https://perma.cc/49GH-
MQFK] (last visited April 23, 2016) (“IGRA requires that Indian gaming occur on Indian lands. Indian 
lands include land within the boundaries of a reservation as well as land held in trust or restricted status 
by the United States on behalf of a tribe . . . over which a tribe has jurisdiction and exercises 
governmental power.”). Cohen’s Handbook explains that when “[o]ff-reservation, however, whether on 
traditional trust land or on land not held in trust but subject to a restriction against alienation, a tribe 
may engage in gaming only if it exercises governmental authority over the off-reservation land.” 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.04[1], at 885 (citations omitted). See generally id. § 
12.04[1]–[2], at 885-87 (discussing off-reservation land). 
66 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B) (2012).  
67 See Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 352–53 (explaining the definitions of “Indian land” and 
“Indian reservation” as understood under IGRA).  
68 See supra Part I (discussing revenue-sharing agreements further); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 17, §12.05[2], at 891 (“These arrangements are known as ‘exclusivity provisions’ and have 
become increasingly prevalent.” (citations omitted)). 
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exclusivity provides ‘substantial economic benefit’ to the tribe.”69 Lastly, 
the tribes must use gaming-generated funds for “specific purposes.”70 A 
state can show it has complied with IGRA when it negotiates with a tribe 
to meet each of these requirements.   
C.  Supreme Court Precedent: Morton v. Mancari 
Connecticut’s recently enacted law and the potential outcome of the 
MGM litigation can be analyzed by comparison to the results of 
constitutional challenges to similar statutes and initiatives adopted in 
California and Massachusetts. Under the guidance of Supreme Court 
precedent regarding federal legislation with Indian tribes, circuit courts 
have so far upheld the constitutionality of state laws favoring Indian 
gaming.  
The Supreme Court first heard constitutional due process and equal 
protection challenges to a federal law that allegedly discriminated on the 
basis of race in favor of Indians in 1974.71 In Morton v. Mancari, the Court 
found that an employment policy of preferring qualified Indians at the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs was consistent with federal Indian policy and 
Congress’ obligation to give Indians “greater participation in their own 
self-government” and in furthering the “[g]overnment’s trust obligation 
toward the Indian tribes.”72 The Court expounded on the special 
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes, 
highlighting the fact that “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with 
the Indian tribes and reservations . . . single out for special treatment a 
constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations.”73 The Court 
determined that in light of this “historical and legal context,”74 the 
preferential treatment of Indians was “not directed towards a ‘racial’ group 
consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applie[d] only to members of ‘federally 
recognized’ tribes . . . exclud[ing] many individuals who are racially to be 
classified as ‘Indians.’”75 Essentially, the Court held that, in the context of 
due process concerns, the Indian preference was “political rather than 
                                                                                                                          
69 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.05[3], at 893 (citations omitted).  
70 Moreover, revenue produced by Class III gaming and retained solely by tribes must be used for 
a specific purpose. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(2), (d)(1)(a)(ii) (2012) (mandating that net revenues from 
tribal gaming shall not be used for purposes other than funding tribal government operations and 
programs, providing for the general welfare of tribes, promoting tribal economic development, 
charitable donations, and funding local government operations).  
71 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).  
72 Id. at 541–42 (citations omitted). The Court went on to say that “[t]he overriding purpose of 
[the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934] was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be 
able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically.” Id. at 542. 
73 Id. at 552.  
74 Id. at 553. 
75 Id. at 553 n.24. 
 1284 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1269 
racial in nature.”76 In an oft-cited passage from the case, the Court 
articulated its test as to whether a preferential Indian law could survive a 
due process challenge:  
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the 
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. 
Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally 
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say 
that Congress’ classification violates due process.77 
The employment preference at the BIA was found to benefit Indian tribes 
because it gave greater control to Indians over their “destinies”78 and 
fulfilled the institutional change needed in Indian affairs to “further the 
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to 
the needs of its constituent groups.”79 Thus, because the employment 
preference was reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-
government—and therefore Congress’ unique obligation to Indians—it did 
not violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.80 Furthermore, 
because the preference was granted to a tribe as a whole, preferential 
treatment was not directed at a race or a national origin.81 Therefore, under 
Mancari, federal laws identifying Indians along tribal lines need only 
survive a rational-basis review—again, the less exacting standard of 
judicial scrutiny.  
Five years later, the Court addressed the issue of whether a preferential 
Indian state law could survive due process challenges. In Washington v. 
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court 
described the circumstance in which the rational-basis review test 
established in Mancari applied to state laws that were preferential to 
Indians.82 The state of Washington had enacted a law asserting partial civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands pursuant to a grant of authority 
from Congress.83 The Yakima Indian Nation contended that the state law, 
                                                                                                                          
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 555. Since Mancari, the scope of the Court’s preferential treatment rationale has extended 
outside the context of Indian self-government and employment preferences. For example, in United 
States v. Antelope, the Court applied its preferential-treatment test to a criminal law and reaffirmed the 
idea that tribal members are treated not as a discrete racial group but as members of quasi-sovereign 
tribal entities. 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977). See generally Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 49–50 
(discussing the implications of the Antelope decision and other decisions extending the Mancari 
rationale beyond Indian self-government).  
78 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553. 
79 Id. at 554. 
80 Id. at 555. 
81 Id. at 554.  
82 439 U.S. 463, 481–483 (1979). 
83 Id. at 481. 
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even if authorized by Congress, nonetheless violated the equal protection 
and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 Emphasizing 
its holding in Mancari, the Court noted that while “[i]t is settled that ‘the 
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal 
Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians,” states did not 
enjoy the “same unique relationship” with Indian tribes.85 Despite this 
apparent deficiency, however, the Court went on to explain that 
Washington’s law was “not simply another state law.”86 Rather, the law 
was “enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to 
readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians,” and that jurisdiction 
under the state law stemmed directly from the federal law.87 In light of this 
presumed correlation between the federal and state laws, the Court applied 
rational-basis review to Washington’s law as if it were federal and 
sustained the preferential treatment.88 The key provision—that the state 
law was enacted in response to a federal goal—has since been employed to 
validate state laws granting explicit preference to Indians or distinguishing 
Indian tribes in constitutional equal protection challenges.89  
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that Mancari is the proper test to 
use when scrutinizing federal Indian legislation in the equal protection 
context.90 The Court, however, has not heard a case regarding the Equal 
Protection Clause in the context of tribal gaming and IGRA. Absent 
Supreme Court authority, circuit and state courts have grappled with 
funneling Mancari through Yakima when presented with preferential state 
tribal gaming laws. Questions have arisen regarding the scope of 
“Congress’ unique obligations” towards Indian tribes and the 
corresponding reach of Mancari—particularly whether grants of exclusive, 
monopolistic gaming rights to Indians actually fulfill those “obligations.”91 
Two recent circuit court decisions in the wake of Mancari and Yakima 
have reluctantly applied the tests articulated by the Court to decide 
constitutional challenges to states’ preferential treatment of Indian tribes in 
the gaming context.  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
84 Id. at 500. 
85 Id. at 500–01.  
86 Id. at 501. 
87 Id. (“In enacting [state law] Chapter 36, Washington was legislating under explicit authority 
granted by Congress in exercise of that federal power.” (emphasis added)).  
88 Id. at 500–01.  
89 The Court explained how the state law furthered both Washington’s and the federal 
government’s interests as follows: “Chapter 36 is fairly calculated to further the State’s interest in 
providing protection to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reservation while at the 
same time allowing scope for tribal self-government on trust or restricted lands.” Id. at 502.  
90 See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 49–50. 
91 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
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D.  Circuit Court Application of and Skepticism Toward Mancari 
1.  Ninth Circuit: Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton  
Various California card clubs and charities that were prohibited under 
California state law from offering Class III gaming brought an action 
challenging the validity of California’s tribal-state compacts allowing only 
in-state tribes to engage in Class III gaming.92 After voter ratification of 
Proposition 1A in March 2000, the California Constitution was amended to 
allow the governor to negotiate compacts with tribes, subject to state 
legislative approval, for the operation of slot machines and lottery games 
on Indian land.93 However, “[b]ecause the California Constitution 
otherwise banned the same casino-style games that the amendment allowed 
for Indian tribes, the result was a tribal monopoly on class III gaming in 
California.”94 The plaintiffs, non-Indians who were then conducting 
gaming operations within the regulations of the state constitution, sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the monopoly violated 
IGRA and equal protection guarantees.95 After first finding that 
Proposition 1A permitted Class III gaming in the state96 and that IGRA 
allowed California to grant a monopoly to their Indian tribes over Class III 
gaming,97 the Ninth Circuit held Proposition 1A and the tribal-state 
compacts did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection of the 
laws.98 
Pursuant to Mancari, the Ninth Circuit first reasoned that the 
distinction between Indian and non-Indian gaming interests was a political 
distinction rather than a racial one.99 The court found that the express terms 
of IGRA (the exclusive right for an Indian tribe, not individual, to enter 
into gaming compacts) and the inherent nature of the tribal-state compact 
resembled an agreement between two sovereign nations, thereby 
solidifying the classification as political.100 The court then found IGRA 
                                                                                                                          
92 Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2003). 
93 Id. at 717–18. 
94 Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 51.  
95 Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 718. 
96 Id. at 721 (“Proposition 1A does more than authorize the Governor to enter into Tribal-State 
compacts. It explicitly states that ‘slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card 
games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands’ subject to the regulations 
embodied in the Tribal-State compact. Thus, there is law—separate from the compact itself—that 
‘permits such gaming’ in certain circumstances.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).   
97 Id. at 731. 
98 Id. at 742.  
99 Id. at 734 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)).  
100 Id. The court went on to state that: 
Further, through IGRA’s compacting process, and through its reliance on tribal 
governments and tribal ordinances to regulate class III gaming, the statute relates to 
tribal status and tribal self-government. The very nature of a Tribal-State compact is 
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authorized gaming only on Indian lands and noted that this was a critical 
limitation in the federal statute “given the well-established connection 
between tribal lands and tribal sovereignty.”101 The court emphasized that 
IGRA centered on the importance of permitting special activities on Indian 
land as a means of furthering tribal sovereignty.102 As promoting self-
sufficiency and self-government was part of Congress’ unique obligation 
towards Indians, the preferential state constitutional amendment was 
validated.103  
Having concluded that IGRA satisfied Mancari, the court next applied 
Yakima to Proposition 1A and found that the state amendment was enacted 
in response to IGRA because “the people of California were legislating 
with reference to the authority that Congress had granted to the State of 
California in IGRA.”104 Specifically, because Proposition 1A was designed 
to readjust state and Indian regulatory authority over Class III gaming on 
Indian land, it “echo[ed]” the requirements of IGRA.105 Since Proposition 
1A furthered Congress’ obligation to tribes and satisfied Yakima, the Ninth 
Circuit applied rational-basis review and found that (1) IGRA and the 
California tribal-state compacts were rationally related to the federal 
government’s interest in furthering tribal self-government;106 and (2) that 
Proposition 1A, despite granting a monopoly to the state’s tribes, served a 
legitimate state interest in regulating a vice activity and promoting 
cooperation between the tribes and the state.”107 Thus, in an early 
application of Mancari to the tribal gaming context, the Ninth Circuit 
found that a state provision granting exclusive gaming rights to Indians did 
not violate equal protection.  
2.  First Circuit: KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick 
Nine years later, the First Circuit heard a similar equal protection 
challenge to a then-recently enacted Massachusetts law in KG Urban 
Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick.108 Under Section 91 of the Massachusetts 
Gaming Act, Massachusetts’s governor could enter into a compact with a 
federally-recognized tribe in the commonwealth that “has purchased, or 
                                                                                                                          
political; it is an agreement between an Indian tribe, as one sovereign, and a state, as 
another.  
Id.  
101 Id. at 735. (“Under IGRA, for example, individual Indians (or even Indian tribes) could not 
establish a class III gaming establishment on non-Indian lands.”).  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 736.  
105 Id. See also supra Part III.B for a discussion of the requirements of IGRA.  
106 Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 736. 
107 Id. at 737. 
108 KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban II), 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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entered into an agreement to purchase, a parcel of land for the proposed 
tribal gaming development.”109 Section 91 further provided that the 
commonwealth’s gaming commission would entertain non-tribal proposals 
only after it was clear that a compact could not first be reached between the 
governor and the commonwealth’s tribes, or if it was clear the tribes would 
not have land on which to operate casinos.110 Although Section 91 did not 
by its literal terms preclude non-tribal gaming, it nonetheless did so if a 
tribal-state compact was approved, regardless of whether any of 
Massachusetts’s tribes had federal Indian land.111 The plaintiff, KG Urban 
Enterprises, LLC (“KG”), an equity development company, had invested 
over $4.6 million in preparing to convert a brownfield site into a multi-use 
property including a gaming facility.112 KG argued that because neither of 
Massachusetts’ federally-recognized tribes possessed any land, tribal 
gaming could not be authorized under IGRA,113 and therefore the tribal-
state compact unreasonably harmed KG’s ability to obtain a gaming 
license.114    
An examination of the first decision in this litigation by a district court 
in Massachusetts, although overturned by the First Circuit on appeal, 
provides insight into judicial frustration with the application of the 
Mancari doctrine in the tribal-gaming context.115 Although the district 
judge dismissed KG’s complaint—finding Massachusetts’s gaming scheme 
was authorized by IGRA116 and that, pursuant to Yakima, a state law 
consistent with federal legislation is reviewed under the rational-basis 
standard117—the court nonetheless opined that Mancari “makes an 
artificial distinction which undermines the constitutional requirement of 
race neutrality.”118 Essentially, the court took issue with what could truly 
be considered as a “unique obligation” owed to Indians in order to trigger 
                                                                                                                          
109 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k § 91(c) (2011). “The compact repeatedly refers to the tribe’s 
‘exclusive’ rights to conduct gaming in Region C if the compact receives legislative approval by July 
31, 2012.” KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6. 
110 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k § 91(e) (2011). At the time of the litigation, Massachusetts’s two 
federally-recognized tribes did not own any federal reservation land within the commonwealth. KG 
Urban II, 693 F.3d at 11–12. The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe had submitted a tribal-state compact to 
the Secretary of Interior, reflecting an application to take federal lands into its trust. Id. at 12. 
111 KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6.  
112 Id. at 11. 
113 Specifically, KG argued that “since the Secretary has not (and most likely cannot under present 
law) authorize a Mashpee-Massachusetts gaming compact under IGRA, the state has excluded KG 
from entering the gaming market and given the Mashpee a preference unlimited in duration.” Id. at 12. 
114 Id.  
115 KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban I), 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, KG Urban II, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Smith & Mayhew, supra 
note 23, at 54 (discussing the district court’s first opinion in the litigation).    
116 KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
117 Id. at 404–05.  
118 Id. at 407. 
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rational-basis review and allow the state law to stand. The court suggested 
that a monopoly over in-state gaming might not qualify as a unique 
obligation towards Indians. The court stated: 
If this Court were addressing the issue as one of first 
impression, it would treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-
political, quasi-racial classification subject to varying levels 
of scrutiny depending on the authority making it and the 
interests at stake. Federal laws relating to native land, tribal 
status or Indian culture would require minimal review 
because such laws fall squarely within the historical and 
constitutional authority of Congress to regulate core Indian 
affairs. Laws granting gratuitous Indian preferences divorced 
from those interests, such as . . . a law granting tribes a quasi-
monopoly on casino gaming, would be subject to more 
searching scrutiny.119 
Clearly, the district court did not think an exclusive right to game was part 
of Congress’ obligation to Indians. 
Massachusetts appealed the decision dismissing its complaint, arguing 
that even if the Commonwealth’s classification was racial in nature, it was 
nonetheless authorized by IGRA and subject to rational-basis review under 
Yakima.120 Interestingly, Paul Clement, the nationally-known attorney and 
former solicitor general under President George W. Bush, represented KG 
in the appeal.121 Attorney Clement, at least once considered a top contender 
for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court, has been involved in 
other cases advocating for an overhaul of Mancari.122 In reversing the 
decision of the district court, the First Circuit started with the premise that 
                                                                                                                          
119 Id. at 404.  
120 KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 17.  
121 Id. at 3; see also Jason Zengerle, The Paul Clement Court, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/paul-clement-2012-3/ [https://perma.cc/9YVN-TVU8] (noting that 
Paul Clement was the solicitor general under the Bush administration, and that “since leaving the 
position of solicitor general under Bush, [Clement] has become, in the Obama age, a sort of anti-
solicitor general—the go-to lawyer for some of the Republican Party’s most significant, and polarizing, 
legal causes.”).  
122 See Camila Domonske, Who Are the Possible Candidates to Fill Scalia’s Seat?, NPR (Feb. 17, 
2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/14/466725863/who-are-the-possible-candidate 
s-to-fill-scalias-seat [https://perma.cc/267W-V2KT] (reporting that Paul Clement remained on the short 
list of likely Republican nominations for a Supreme Court vacancy); Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme 
Court Farm Team, NEW YORKER (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/the-supreme-court-farm-team [https://perma.cc/8FSJ-6G9A] (reporting that former solicitor 
general Paul Clement was a contender for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court). 
Paul Clement was counsel for the guardian ad litem before the Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple 
v. Baby Girl, a case that argued, in part, to overturn Mancari. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying 
footnotes for a discussion of the litigious attack on Mancari. Paul Clement may have a role in the 
MGM litigation, if the case proceeds to the appellate level.  
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IGRA “limits the conditions under which tribes are allowed to enter into 
gaming”123 and that, pursuant to IGRA, tribal gaming may only be 
conducted by an Indian tribe on Indian lands.124 The court, however, 
expressed doubts that Mancari could be extended to apply to preferential 
state classifications and noted the differences between the two cases: that 
Mancari involved several sources of federal authority—including the 
commerce clause, treaty power, and a special trust—and the Massachusetts 
law only dealt “with [the] establishment of gaming facilities and not 
employment of Indians within agencies whose mission is to assist 
Indians.”125 The court chided Massachusetts for failing to provide legal 
authority that state classifications based on tribal status not authorized by 
federal law nonetheless could qualify as political classifications.126 The 
cases that Massachusetts did rely on—Yakima included—upheld those 
state laws that were explicitly authorized by federal law; laws that were 
“not like this case,” according to the court.127 
The First Circuit then voiced its doubts that a tribal-state compact 
negotiated under Section 91 would even be authorized by IGRA.128 The 
court stated that:  
It would be difficult to conclude that the IGRA “authorizes” 
the Massachusetts statute under these circumstances—where 
there are no Indian lands . . . within the meaning of the 
IGRA. Further, [Supreme Court precedent] may in the end 
prohibit the Secretary from taking the Mashpee lands into 
trust and so making them Indian lands, a question not yet 
resolved.129  
                                                                                                                          
123 KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 7.  
124 Id. at 8.  
125 Id. at 19; see also Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 54 (“The First Circuit’s reading of 
Mancari focuses on that opinion’s discussion of the relationship between tribes and the federal 
government, and less on the political/racial distinction, which is based not only on the federal 
relationship but also on the independent status of tribes as semi-sovereigns.”).  
126 KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 19 (“The defendants cite no authority holding that state preferential 
classifications based on tribal status which are not authorized by federal law are nonetheless not racial 
classifications under Mancari.”). 
127 The court noted that instead, Massachusetts cited “a number of cases upholding state laws, 
which are not like this case, said to be authorized by federal law under the rational of Yakima . . . see 
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 736 (9th Cir. 2003), U.S. v. Garrett, 122 
Fed. Appx. 628, 631-33 (4th Cir. 2005), Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 722 n.10 
(9th Cir. 1986), Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 727 (Minn. 
2008), N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1998)).” Id. at 19–20.  
128 Id. at 20 (“We turn next to the defendants’ argument that nevertheless the state may still make 
the classification, because § 91 is authorized by the IGRA under Yakima. In the present posture of this 
case, that too is quite doubtful.”).  
129 Id. at 21 (“KG does not dispute that if a federally recognized tribe in Massachusetts currently 
possessed ‘Indian lands’ within the meaning of the IGRA, § 91 would fall sufficiently within the scope 
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It was with this trepidation that the First Circuit ultimately found that KG’s 
complaint should not have been dismissed because the issue still existed 
whether the state scheme was authorized by IGRA and therefore fell within 
Yakima, triggering rational-basis review.130 The First Circuit was not 
convinced that Massachusetts’s gaming law was authorized by IGRA, but 
left the question open on remand.131  
The First and Ninth Circuits each concluded that the respective states’ 
preferential treatment of Indians correlated closely enough with IGRA to 
not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. In regards to tribal 
gaming, the decisions thus reflect two routes a court can take. First, a court 
can require that a state law be specifically authorized by IGRA, as was 
found in Artichoke Joe’s, to qualify for rational-basis review.132 
Conversely, a court can require that the state law not be explicitly 
authorized by IGRA, but rather merely implement or reflect IGRA, as the 
First Circuit indicated in KG Urban.133 As noted previously, Connecticut’s 
                                                                                                                          
of the IGRA’s authorization and thus be subject to only rational basis review.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
130 Id. at 24. The First Circuit found that IGRA applied only to gaming on Indian lands, but with 
no such “Indian lands” held by the tribe in question, it was therefore doubtful IGRA could apply. Id. 
(“In sum, whether § 91 is ‘authorized’ by the IGRA such that it falls within Yakima and is subject to 
only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and 
implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in the suit.”).  
131 Id. at 27. On remand, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the state gaming law on 
summary judgment. KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban III), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2437, 
at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014). The court, however, again noted its skepticism (as it had in its first 
opinion) that “this constitutional framework faithfully reflects the text and purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause.” Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The district court went on to say that “acting upon 
such misgivings is not within the purview of a United States District Judge. The Supreme Court may 
choose to exercise its institutional prerogative to revisit questionable precedent but until then this Court 
is constrained.” Id.  
The district court found that although the Massachusetts Gaming Act was not fully authorized by 
IGRA, it could be considered a “parallel mechanism” to IGRA and therefore warranted rational-basis 
review for a limited period, while the Mashpee awaited its fate to see if its lands were taken into trust. 
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). The court reiterated the warnings of the First Circuit; namely, that if the 
Mashpee tribe were explicitly foreclosed from taking land into trust by the federal government, then 
KG Urban would prevail in the case, because the facts wouldn’t be authorized by IGRA then. Id. at 5. 
Ultimately, the court determined the eighteen-month delay while awaiting approval from the Secretary 
of the Interior did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 6.  
132 Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); see also COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 14.03[2][b], at 960 (“Some courts have concluded that unless a state law 
embodying an Indian classification is specifically authorized by a federal statute or treaty, it should not 
benefit from the more relaxed standard of review found in Morton v. Mancari.”). 
133 In KG Urban II, the First Circuit noted that, “[i]f the Secretary is willing under the IGRA to 
approve a tribal-state compact contingent on the relevant land being acquired in trust, then the 
Commonwealth can argue that § 91 establishes a parallel mechanism, meant to facilitate the purposes 
of the IGRA, even if not precisely authorized by the IGRA, for a limited period of time.” KG Urban II, 
693 F.3d at 25 (emphasis added); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 14.03[2][b], at 960–
61 (“Others have taken a broader view, asserting that state laws may be reviewed under the more 
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law does not comport with IGRA, and therefore, may not be specifically 
authorized by the statute. The issue that Connecticut’s law raises, then, is 
what the contours of an IGRA reflection look like and if Connecticut’s law 
comes close enough to matching those guidelines.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF MANCARI 
A.  United States District Court for the District of Connecticut: MGM’s 
Pending Litigation  
Since the Supreme Court has yet to establish the proper constitutional 
analysis for state laws granting preferential treatment to Indians for tribal 
gaming, it is probable that the Connecticut district court will follow the 
reasoning employed by the circuit courts. According to the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Artichoke Joe’s, an analysis of a preferential state law for tribal 
gaming proceeds under both the Mancari and Yakima frameworks. Under 
Mancari, the state law must first designate an Indian tribe not along 
individual, racial determinations, but along tribal lines to establish its 
classification as political. Next, the state law must be enacted in response 
to the federal Indian regulatory framework; that is, the state law must be 
enacted in furtherance of a federal measure that advances Congress’ 
obligation to Indians. Only after these first two requirements are met can a 
district court apply the less demanding rational-basis review in determining 
the state statute’s constitutionality.  
Connecticut’s law differs significantly from the state laws reviewed by 
the First and Ninth circuits. In Artichoke Joe’s, the case concerned Class 
III gaming operations that were located on Indian reservations or Indian 
trust lands134 and tribal-state compacts had been approved three years prior 
to the litigation.135 The court found that the state legislation at issue, 
Proposition 1A, had been ratified by the people of California “with 
reference to the authority that Congress had granted to the State of 
California in IGRA[,]” thereby associating the law with IGRA and 
qualifying the law for rational-basis review.136 Likewise, the litigation in 
KG Urban II centered on the Mashpee tribal-state compact between 
Massachusetts and the Mashpee Wampanoag, thereby aligning the state 
law with IGRA.137 Although the First Circuit was skeptical because of the 
                                                                                                                          
relaxed standard as long as they operate to implement, reflect, or effectuate federal laws, thereby 
fulfilling Congress’s evidence intent to benefit Indians.”). 
134 Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 735 n.16.  
135 See id. at 717 (discussing the tribal-state compacts negotiated by former California state 
Governor Gray Davis and approved by the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs).  
136 Id. at 736.   
137 KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6 (describing the tribal-state compact underlying the instant 
litigation).   
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Mashpee’s lack of federally-recognized Indian land, the court nonetheless 
reinstated the plaintiffs’ complaint. Contrarily, Connecticut’s new law 
contains no reference to previously-established tribal-state compacts 
between Connecticut and the Tribes, or to Class III gaming on the Tribes’ 
reservation land.138  
Opponents of the Act may posit that it is conceivable that the district 
court will find that the Act fails the Yakima framework, since it is arguable 
that the Act does not reflect the federal Indian regulatory framework.139 
They will argue that first and foremost, Connecticut has already 
established the parameters of how its state legislation over tribal gaming 
would comport with IGRA. Connecticut has adopted two tribal-state 
compacts with its federally-recognized tribes, which have governed the 
state’s two casinos for over twenty years.140 If Connecticut wanted to 
continue in its tribal gaming framework, the Act surely would have 
contemplated a role within the two existing tribal-state compacts or at least 
an extension of them as they now exist. However, the Act contains no 
mention of the existing tribal-state compacts and grants only a new, 
exclusive right to the two tribes to form a “tribal business entity.”141 
Opponents may further argue that even if it is assumed that the Act is in 
fact a state policy that “reflect[s]”142 the federal regulatory framework, the 
Act does not contain any express provisions subjecting the new tribal 
entity to the provisions of IGRA. As mentioned previously, IGRA requires 
a state and tribe to enter into a gaming compact governing the conduct of 
gaming on reservation land,143 but the Act is silent regarding a requirement 
                                                                                                                          
138 In fact, as Senator Fasano noted in session hearings before the Connecticut General Assembly, 
the Act is “in contradiction of the compact” because it contemplates a third casino located off-site from 
the Tribes’ reservation land. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Complaint, Exhibit 6, at 4, MGM Resorts Int’l Global Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-
1182-AWT (D. Conn. Oct. 29, 2015); see also Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact, 
59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 1994) (detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming as specifically 
located on the Mohegan reservation in Uncasville, Connecticut); Tribal-State Compact Between the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of Connection, 56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing 
the conduct and operations of casino gaming on the Pequot reservation in Mashantucket, Connecticut).  
139 The New York Court of Appeals described the reflection stating: “[W]hile States do not enjoy 
th[e] same unique relationship, they may adopt laws and policies to reflect or effectuate Federal laws 
designed ‘to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians,’ without opening themselves to the 
charge that they have engaged in race-based discrimination.” N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores v. 
Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).   
140 See Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact, 59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 1994) 
(detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming on the Mohegan reservation in Uncasville, 
Connecticut); Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of 
Connecticut, 56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming 
on the Pequot reservation in Mashantucket, Connecticut).  
141 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.). 
142 Urbach, 699 N.E. 2d at 908.  
143 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2012) (listing the requirements for a tribal-state compact).  
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for Connecticut and MMCT Venture to enter into any such compact.144 
Moreover, the Act does not require that Connecticut’s third casino be 
located on reservation land. Unlike the legislation at issue in Artichoke 
Joe’s and KG Urban, the Act remains completely open-ended about where 
the new casino would be located and as seen from media accounts, towns 
and municipalities across the state have initiated steps to submit site 
proposals to MMCT Venture.145 This blatant lack of federally-recognized 
Indian land certainly recalls the uncertainty the First Circuit had over 
whether the tribe in KG Urban would obtain such land.146 Without 
adhering to the basic requirements of IGRA, it is plausible that the 
Connecticut district court will not uphold the legislation as a state 
regulation furthering the goals of Congress’ relationship with Indians.147 
Proponents of preferential treatment for Indians may counter that 
Connecticut’s law is constitutional even though it is not specifically 
authorized by IGRA. First, it is arguable that a federal connection—here, a 
tribal-state compact and a third casino on federally-recognized Indian 
land—is not necessary for application of rational-basis review, as opposed 
to strict scrutiny review.148 A preeminent Indian law source notes that the 
Supreme Court has held “that the federal relationship with tribes does not 
preclude protective state laws which do not infringe on federally protected 
rights. . . . If Indians are a legitimate classification for protective federal 
                                                                                                                          
144 Rather, the Act calls only for an amendment to state law once the tribal business entity selects 
and enters into an agreement with a municipality. 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). 
145 See supra Part II.A.   
146 KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban II), 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
147 If the Act met the requirements of IGRA, it would easily fulfill Congress’ goals under IGRA. 
In United States v. Garrett, the Fourth Circuit upheld North Carolina’s gaming law in an attack on its 
constitutionality regarding differing treatment of a non-Indian gaming operator from the state’s Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians because it fulfilled the goals of IGRA. 122 F. App’x 628, 633 (4th Cir. 
2005). First noting the existence of a state-tribal compact between North Carolina and the tribe, the 
court reasoned:  
Applying the rational basis standard for Indian tribal preferences set forth in 
Mancari, we hold that the gaming preferences given to the Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The 
laws creating this preference “promot[e] the economic development of federally 
recognized Indian tribes (and thus their members)[.]” . . . The Supreme Court has 
explicitly held that this goal constitutes not just a legitimate, but an important 
government interest . . . . It also appears undisputed that gaming operators derive 
significant profits from their business. Therefore, gaming preferences for Indian 
tribes conducted on tribal land are a rational means of ensuring the economic 
development of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. For these reasons, North 
Carolina’s State-Tribal Compact and the scheme set forth by the IGRA easily pass 
muster under the rational basis standard of review. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
148 Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 370. 
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laws, their status is arguably the same for state laws of that character.”149 
Such an argument would rely on the theory that the lack of a federal 
connection is not fatal to the constitutionality of Connecticut’s law. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the character of classification does not 
change because a state, and not the federal government, defines it.150 
Secondly, proponents may argue that the Act’s goals parallel those of 
IGRA: IGRA states that “a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to 
promote tribal economic development, [and] tribal self-sufficiency” and as 
Connecticut’s two casinos have been successful at this already, the third 
under the Act would do the same.151 Proponents would demonstrate that 
casinos foster tribal economic development and self-sufficiency by relying 
on the fact that casino gaming has already generated thousands of jobs 
(including jobs for tribal members), raised revenue for tribes, and helped 
remove tribal members from welfare.152 A third casino in Connecticut 
would presumably do the same for the state and for the region, thereby 
fostering the two Tribes’ economic development and self-sufficiency.   
B.  The Attack on Morton v. Mancari 
This Note posits that a developing trend, as seen in Artichoke Joe’s and 
KG Urban, reflects insight more subtle than just the forthcoming judicial 
analysis of the constitutional challenges to the Act by the Connecticut 
district court. Artichoke Joe’s and KG Urban represent circuit courts’ 
skepticism of the constitutional framework regarding the analysis of state 
laws governing tribal gaming and the increasing attack on the Mancari 
“political versus racial classification” doctrine. Connecticut, by granting its 
two tribes a monopoly on casino-gaming completely outside of IGRA, has 
overstepped the boundaries and contours of the federal government’s 
obligations to Indians. Connecticut’s Act may be the first in a series of 
state laws “granting gratuitous Indian preferences”153 that seek to retain the 
benefits of tribal gaming within their borders by manipulating the federal 
regulatory framework and the corresponding constitutional analysis. The 
Act has warped the outer contours of IGRA to a point where arguably the 
federal statute is no longer recognizable. As a result, the Supreme Court 
may be forced to adapt by implementing a more scrutinizing level of 
review to be applied when deciding challenges to state tribal-gaming laws.  
                                                                                                                          
149 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 659. 
150 “On the one hand, the nature of a classification, in theory, should not change based upon the 
identity of the sovereign making it. If a classification is political when the federal government makes it, 
it is difficult to imagine that it could be anything other than political when a state or local government 
makes it.” KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403 (D. Mass. 2012).  
151 See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2012).  
152 Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 373–74.  
153 KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 404.  
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Litigation since Mancari and lawyers representing sides both for and 
against tribal interests have noted the mounting attack on preferential 
treatment for Indians.154 Interests contrary to Indian preferences have made 
a “concerted effort to put key . . . doctrines before the [Supreme] Court. 
One of the best examples of this is the repeated effort to get the Court to 
revisit the critical holding in Morton v. Mancari.”155 Advocates for stricter 
judicial scrutiny of preferential Indian laws cite to the 1995 case Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, in which the Supreme Court held that all racial 
classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny review, as support 
that Mancari is no longer applicable.156 The Adarand rule has been used by 
advocates against Indian interests to justify applying strict scrutiny, even 
for laws that further Congress’ obligations toward Indians.157 For example, 
in another opinion, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to reflect on the 
effect of Adarand on Mancari, stating that: 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Adarand only adds 
to our constitutional doubts. . . . In Adarand, the Court ruled 
that racial classifications by the federal government are 
subject to strict scrutiny. . . . Justice Stevens in dissent argued 
that the majority’s ‘concept of consistency . . . would view 
the special preferences that the National Government has 
provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to 
the official discrimination against African Americans that 
was prevalent for much of our history.’ If Justice Stevens is 
right about the logical implications of Adarand, Mancari’s 
days are numbered.158 
Another manner by which opponents have argued to reverse Mancari 
is to limit its application to only uniquely Indian interests, which is defined 
as interests protected by legislation that “relat[e] to Indian lands, tribal 
                                                                                                                          
154 See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 951 (listing examples of litigation, legislation and scholarly 
work attacking the Mancari doctrine). 
155 Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 48. 
156 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).   
157 See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23 (documenting uses of the holding in Adarand as the basis 
for several petitions to the Supreme Court to overturn Mancari). 
158 Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit 
reviewed an equal protection challenge to the Reindeer Act of 1937, which limited the sale of reindeers 
in Alaska to non-natives to provide Alaska natives with economic security and a stable food supply. In 
their petition for certiorari, the Williams appellees argued for Supreme Court review to decide whether 
rational-basis review adopted in Mancari would continue to be applied to constitutional challenges to 
congressional laws favoring Indians, however, the Supreme Court declined to consider the case. See 
Kawerak Reindeer Herders Ass’n v. Williams, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998) (denying the appellees’ petition 
for writ of certiorari).  
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status, self-government or culture.”159 In Mancari, the unique Indian 
interest was the employment preference for hiring Indians to the federal 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and was designed expressly to foster tribal self-
government.160 It is doubtful that a casino monopoly, a sure result of 
Connecticut’s law, would be such a “unique” Indian interest.161 Against 
this backdrop of judicial skepticism and forceful advocacy to overturn the 
Mancari framework, Connecticut’s legislation stands poised to finally push 
the Supreme Court to review its Indian law jurisprudence.162  
C.  Connecticut’s Role in the Mancari Attack 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether state or local laws 
granting Indians preferential treatment should be reviewed under the same 
lenient rational-basis review as federal laws doing the same. In that void, 
states remain free to push the boundaries as far as this current 
constitutional framework will allow them. Accordingly, Connecticut has 
capitalized in this area. While questions of equal protection and the status 
of state classifications are crucial here, the dormant commerce clause issue 
still looms large in the background. Underlying a piece of legislation that 
on its face seems to abide by the Constitution, Connecticut has sought to 
advance its own economic interests in the name of tribal self-sufficiency 
and tribal self-government.163 While there is nothing technically wrong 
with a state advancing certain industries within its borders or creating jobs 
for its individual citizens, a reviewing court must be wary when a state 
manipulates the Indian constitutional framework to achieve such goals. 
IGRA, Mancari, and their respective acceptance of racially preferential 
treatment of Indians must remain connected to Congress’ obligation 
towards Indians. Without a stake in IGRA, states should be monitored 
closely when passing legislation that shows favoritism towards Indians at 
the expense of others. Courts, and most importantly the Supreme Court, 
must react accordingly. While the First and Ninth circuits rightfully 
expressed skepticism at the constitutional framework, they nonetheless 
                                                                                                                          
159 See Response of Guardian Ad Litem in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 2012 WL 5209997, at *11 (Oct. 22, 2012) (advocating that the 
Mancari doctrine should be overturned upon Supreme Court review).  
160 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974).  
161 The Williams court, for instance, expressed its doubts that casino gambling is a uniquely 
Indian interest: “[f]or example, we seriously doubt that Congress could give Indians a complete 
monopoly on the casino industry or on Space Shuttle Contracts.” Williams, 115 F.3d at 665. 
162 So far, the Supreme Court has denied petitions for certiorari in cases, among others, 
challenging the Reindeer Act of 1937, Kawerak Reindeer Herders Ass’n, 523 U.S. 1117; the California 
state constitutional amendment at issue in Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 543 U.S. 815 (2004); and federal 
flight limitations over the Grand Canyon, AirStar Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 538 U.S. 977 (2003).  
163 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 
Exhibit 6, supra note 138 (reporting Senator Looney’s remarks on the Connecticut General Assembly’s 
goals behind the Act).         
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upheld the state legislation at issue. Connecticut’s law, however, may be 
finally starting to push the right buttons to trigger an overhaul of judicial 
scrutiny. If it does, this Note argues only that a more intricate level of 
analysis is required and not that a stricter level of scrutiny necessarily be 
applied in every challenge to state laws granting preferential status to 
Indians per se. Rather, courts should take the time to truly parse through 
state legislation to ensure it adheres to the framework established in IGRA. 
This can be accomplished by first ensuring that legislation dealing with 
tribal gaming adheres in some manner to IGRA, either explicitly or by 
reflection. Then, only after such determination, can a court apply the 
Mancari and Yakima frameworks to ensure that a state has acted 
constitutionally with its preferential legislation. Without a more detailed 
level of judicial scrutiny in this area, states will remain free to exploit tribal 
gaming in their borders for in-state economic benefits in the name of 
“tribal self-sufficiency and growth.”   
 
 
